In studying the Problem of Evil and Suffering, I have often wondered why God didn’t make our human will (volition) more like His own–genuinely free but never misused. People have often suggested a form of the free will defense saying that the moral evil in the world is a result of our free will, but that’s just the price paid to have such a great good as “free will.” But that form of the free will defense seems to fall short. It doesn’t reconcile the fact that God, presumably the most free being there is (having no coercive power acting on Him), could have made our free will closer in kind to His own, so we rarely or never sin–yet God did not make our will’s like that. So God could have made things better than they are now, therefore, there is no maximally great creator God.
I think there’s a fairly straight-forward solution to this problem. Perhaps it is the case that we can have substantially different “free will”–suitable to our finite, mortal, nature–which is nonetheless good and valuable in many ways besides merely moral goodness. We may be more prone to sin and corruption, but God has more purposes at work in our volition than mere morality. Permit me to illustrate.
Surely a particular crystal vase is more fragile than some iron vase, a wood vase, or a sturdy plastic vase. In terms of fragility, the crystal vase ranks lower than the others. But a vase is not merely intended for sturdiness. A vase can serve for storage, independent beauty, coordinated decoration within some ensemble. It could function as a flower pot, or a hiding place. there are a number of different “goods” for which that crystal vase could be enlisted. We are too narrow in our demands if we judge a vase strictly in terms of its sturdiness.
In the same way, our limited and fallen human capacity for choice (volition/will/agency) may not be the sternest stuff God could have formed in us. Nevertheless, it may still be good for God to have made us with a corruptible will, since there can be other redeeming values at work in it. There may be contingent kinds of beauty, goodness, and usefulness (i.e., aesthetic, moral, and instrumental values) and these, metaphysically speaking, may require the kind of volition that we people have. God could have made our wills to be very nearly like His own so that we never sin (or if our finite nature demands it), or so that we would rarely sin. But God did not make us merely to avoid sin, He made us to create things, discover the world, relate with others, fall in love, build, grow, learn, and change. Each of these can enlist our volition in different ways so that mere “sinlessness” is a shallow ambition compared to the many uses to which our volition can be directed.
Now, I’m not saying that “sin” is okay, or that it’s “no big deal.” Sin is a very big deal, but my point is that our volition may be about more than simply moral goodness. Our volition predicated the fall of humanity, and it leaves us susceptible to further sin and corruption. But our volition also fosters invention, education, exploration, creation, and all sorts of honorable attributes of humankind. Our human nature may be a crystal vase of sorts, vulnerable in some ways, prone to spots and breakage, yet it remains useful and beautiful beyond our imagination.
The problem of evil and suffering is still a real problem, but we have one less reason to retreat in fear. The free will defense is an important and powerful response to this problem, provided we remember the various and many values involved in our human volition.
 I’m allowing for that sake of argument that we may have either (A) an identical will as God’s but which applies in a substantially different way with Him as with Us, or (B) we have a will which is, in itself, substantially different from God’s. With either option, any shared concept, such as “volition,” applies differently to God than to us (i.e., the doctrine of analogy). God is infinite, we are finite; He knows all, we know little; He has perfect autonomous self-control, we are contingent dependent beings.